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I. Introduction
Market-oriented reforms in China have resulted in spectacular economic performance over more than three decades now. Transforming the enterprise sector has been a central part in the market reform process in which private entrepreneurs emerged and expanded rapidly with increasing contributions to economic growth and structural transformation in China.
Despite the rapid expansion of the private sector in the economy, the state-led resource allocation has been an important part of China's economic reform strategy, having exerted substantial effects on the survival of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the evolution of the private enterprises. Focusing on capital, land, energy and utilities as key resources, we examine how the state has changed and reformed the institutional systems governing the supply and distribution of these resources during the market reform process. At the same time, we investigate the extent of outcomes that enterprises of different ownership types have experienced with respect to access to these resources and the policy implications. Firm behaviour and responses are examined in the sectoral and ownership patterns of investment activities, asset and output shares, and profit and productivity performance. This examination approach sheds light on the puzzle of China's rapid economic growth with an expansion of the private sector in the total economy, but accompanied by the existence of and the predominant role played by SOEs in some of the key sectors in the economy such as oil, petrochemicals, aviation, steel, coal, finance, telecommunications and railways.
State control of the development of capital, land and resource markets has in general created substantial rents that have been directed to important infrastructure projects and provision of public goods, thereby facilitating economic transition and contributing to rapid economic growth. At the same time, such rents have also produced side effects caused by the state control of resources including rent-seeking activities by both governments and enterprises, worsening the ways by which resources are allocated. The misallocation of resources has been found to be linked with structural imbalances such as overcapacity in certain sectors, and significant negative impacts on the development of private entrepreneurship, which holds the key to increasing the productivity and growth potential of China (Deer and Song, 2012) .
II. Economic transition, state-controlled resources and entrepreneurship
It has been long recognised that in a market economy, entrepreneurship drives economic growth through a 'creative destruction' process, a term coined by Schumpeter in the early twentieth century (Carree and Thurik, 2003) . Development economics views entrepreneurship as a driving force of economic growth and structural transformation (Naudé, 2010; Gries and Naudé, 2008) . This view is particularly relevant for a country in the process of economic transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based one. The connection between the market and entrepreneurship suggests that market transition is always associated with the emergence and evolution of the private sector in the economy. The progress of market reforms can be seen in the expansion and diversity of the activities of private entrepreneurs (Tanas and Audretsch, 2011) . While there are commonly agreed traits of entrepreneurs, such as being alert to profit opportunities, creativity and risk-taking (Lu, 1994) , the nature of entrepreneurship could be quite different, depending crucially on the institutional settings of an economy.
The nature and types of entrepreneurship
According to Ahmad and Hoffman (2008) , the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines entrepreneurship as a reflection of entrepreneurial activity, which is determined mainly by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are those persons who own and manage businesses with the purpose of value generation through creation or expansion of economic activity, by identifying and exploiting new products, processes or markets.
The OECD definition of entrepreneurship is consistent with an observation made by Schumpeter in the early twentieth century. Schumpeter (1934) considered entrepreneurship to be an innovative process in which entrepreneurs, as innovators with willingness to take risks, seek profits by creating new products or new production processes with better values to replace old ones, implying higher productivity.
Therefore, entrepreneurship is associated with a value-creation process, which he called 'creative destruction', which leads to true economic progress. In addition, introducing new products or processes is seen as creating disequilibrium in the existing market (Lu, 1994) .
The Schumpeterian view of entrepreneurship which is called high-level entrepreneurship (Karlsson et al., 2004 ) is, however, rather narrow, as it focuses only on new value created by new products or processes. Other processes that are not purely innovative can contribute to value generation too. Kirzner (1998) suggested that, being alert to market opportunities, entrepreneurs can make profits through filling the gap between supply and demand in the market, either with production or with trade. By this equilibrating role of the entrepreneur (Lu, 1994) , more value in terms of profit can be generated through contributing to flows of goods and services. This kind of entrepreneurship is called low-level entrepreneurship, and an example is firms in the wholesale and retail trades (Karlsson et al., 2004) .
The two early views of entrepreneurship miss an important fact: not all entrepreneurial efforts bring benefits to society as a whole, despite profits brought to entrepreneurs themselves. Baumol identified this feature of entrepreneurship in his seminal paper (1990). Baumol suggests there are different types of entrepreneurship, including productive, unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship, due to the reward structure created by a certain institutional setting with the existence of the market.
Given a country's institutional structure, entrepreneurs can take market opportunities to make profit with their talent. The entrepreneur's market-based activities will create more wealth or value for society, making productive entrepreneurship. There are also profit opportunities in political and legal processes that could attract entrepreneurial efforts. The entrepreneurial efforts in political and legal arenas can accumulate personal wealth through changing government policy in taxation and subsidy; however, these efforts do not generate additional social wealth, but rather redistribute wealth, leading to so-called unproductive entrepreneurship.
Moreover, in some cases, entrepreneurial efforts involve illegal activities, which may cause the loss of social wealth (though not necessarily losses of private wealth), making entrepreneurship destructive. Whether entrepreneurial efforts become productive, unproductive or destructive depends on how profitable opportunities are in market and non-market situations. The reward outcomes depend totally on the country's institutional structure which determines the ways in which entrepreneurs are allocating their time and efforts. As Sobel (2008) elaborates, productive entrepreneurship is more likely to expand in a market-supportive institutional framework that is characterised by secure property rights, a fair and balanced judicial system, effective contract enforcement, appropriate business regulation and effective control of government
power.
An important implication of Baumol's theory is that entrepreneurship growth is not always translated into economic growth and the healthy expansion of entrepreneurship is determined by a sound incentive structure of institutions. Baumol's view of entrepreneurship has particularly relevant implications for the analysis of entrepreneurship development in a transitional economy like China's, in which institutional change to a market economy is central to the transition process. A transitional institutional framework may have created many non-market profit opportunities that attract those business-minded people who are able to exploit institutional loopholes and have become entrepreneurs under market transition.
Moreover, transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based one has created many rent-seeking opportunities that are conducive to unproductive entrepreneurship.
Market transition and evolution of entrepreneurship
Market transition is a long process with different stages of establishing the system with market rules and emerging private firms with different forms to those of state firms (Kolodko, 2000) . While it is complex to delineate the transition process and corresponding entrepreneurship, a typology of different stages of transition with different types of entrepreneurship would be useful. Estrin et al. (2008) provided such a typology by suggesting three stages of transition in which different kinds of entrepreneurship exist. The initial stage or early transition is characterised by initialising market channels of goods distribution and abandoning planned channels of resource allocation. There are frequent adjustments of relative prices and gaps between demand and supply, creating opportunities for mainly Kirznian types of entrepreneursentrepreneurs that perceive opportunities in a highly uncertain environment and unknown territory (Kirzner, 1973) . As a result, there is a lot of uncertainty due to the unavailability of market information and macro-economic instability.
In the second stage, uncertainty is reduced due to more market information, less extreme price fluctuations and a more stable macro-economic environment. The fundamentals of a market system such as property rights are established, providing incentives for Schumpeterian entrepreneurship to emerge. The third stage would follow with further development of market institutions, which becomes the main force of resource coordination and information provision for market participants. Contract enforcement becomes more dependent on courts. Entrepreneurs can have better access to resources through financial institutions and market exchange. This stage of market transition provides an institutional environment conducive for the expansion of Schumpeterian entrepreneurship. As Estrin et al. (2008) noted, however, the early forms of entrepreneurship may continue to exist in the later stage of market reform due to the inertia of institutional changes with respect to market development and the required rules and regulations.
Determinants of entrepreneurship
In an analytical framework of entrepreneurship development, Ahmad and Hoffman (2008) advantage of business opportunities and make a successful business, the availability of capital is the crucial factor. This factor depends on the entrepreneur's access to financial resources such as a banking system, stock markets and other financial institutions.
The above analytical framework would be useful for examining the nature, characteristics and performance of entrepreneurship in an economy with an established system of market institutions; however, there are some missing elements in the framework for a transitional economy. The analysis of the performance of entrepreneurship in transition would need to take into account two important processes:
1) the process of setting up and building market institutions, including laws and regulations to recognise and ensure private property rights and to govern market transactions; and 2) the parallel process of ownership transformation. The next subsection will explain why it is important to incorporate these processes into analysis of entrepreneurship performance.
State control of resources and the development of entrepreneurship in transition
Market-oriented reform basically involves changing the relative role of the state and the market in the coordination of production, exchange and distribution activities with the main objective of improving efficiency and promoting economic growth. In China, like other former centrally planned economies, market-oriented reform started from a point of 'only state, no market' (Zhang, 2002, p. 10) . At this starting point, the centrally Changing state control of resources under market conditions gives rise to the fundamental question of the interaction of the state and the market. While it is generally expected that the scope of state intervention will be reduced, an important observation is that in economic transition the state plays an indispensable and guiding role in the establishment of the market system, which aims to provide open competition for all firms. This is particularly true of China's experience with its well-known gradualist approach to market reform. The leading role of the state is needed because market reform is basically a process of institutional change. Institutional change is a long process and it takes time to build new market institutions and entrench them in an economic system (Murrel and Wang, 1993; World Bank, 2001 Given the leading role of the state in economic transition, the interaction between market liberalisation and state control of resources could affect strongly entrepreneurial activities in both positive and negative ways. It is positive when the state moves the economy towards more market-oriented changes such as perfection of market mechanisms including market entry, etc. providing further room for entrepreneurs to flourish; and it could be negative if the state strengthens its control over the allocation of key resources preventing private entrepreneurs from accessing to those resources for development. As discussed above, due to state-dominated ownership of all economic activities, enterprises had to rely on the state for their access not only to production factors (capital, land and other natural resources), but also to basic inputs (energy and utilities). In China as well as other transitional economies, market reform led to the development of markets for these resources, and the emergence of entrepreneurship would not be possible if the state did not reduce its control of and restriction on the access to these resources. Therefore, the dynamics and performance of the private sector would depend significantly on the extent and ways of releasing the state's control of these key resources. Moreover, state dominance through sole ownership or SOE presence means state monopoly in the markets, implying distortions of factor markets and the existence of substantial rents. The literature on rent and rent-seeking suggests that the existence of rents due to state interventions during market transformation is inevitable and there are certain rents that are growth-enhancing (Khan, 2004) , but a lot of rent-seeking activities are damaging the economy. The existence of rampant corruption is a testimony of this development. A crucial question here is whether the state is able to manage and utilise these rents to enhance economic development. For example, the state can promote private investment by transferring the rents to entrepreneurs through market entry and participation or the state can use the rents for financing public goods provision. In addition, the existence of rents leads to another important question of how these rents can be distributed and used in an equitable manner. The way in which the state deals with the rents in transition in terms of the allocation and distribution will influence the ways in which private entrepreneurial activities take place. We will examine these issues in the context of China's market transition and the evolution of private entrepreneurship.
II. State control of resources and private entrepreneurship in the initial stage of reform: 1978-92
One key feature of the early stage of reform in China was the dual-track price system with partial market liberalisation. Following the rapid and successful transformation of agricultural cooperatives under the commune system to a household-based production system, market exchanges were gradually allowed to take a greater share along with planning channels in line with the application of a contract responsibility system in industrial enterprises later on. Liberalisation took place progressively in the product markets, from consumer goods to materials and inputs for agricultural and industrial production. Gradual marketisation created ample opportunities for the expansion of non-state private businesses through exploiting the huge gaps between demand and supply resulting from the acute shortage problems under the planning mechanism (Garnaut et al., 2001) . Observing the ways private business activities emerged outside the state sector, Lu (1994) (Wu, 2009, p. 34) . Initial opening to FDI promoted trading activities between local entrepreneurs and their counterparts in Hong Kong, which emerged in the late, 1970s (Tsai, 2007, p. 55 ).
China's non-state sector 2 had its rapid expansion and contribution to output and employment in the 1980s. Song (2015, p. 190) indicates that, in the period 1978-92, the share of SOEs in gross industrial output value decreased from 78 per cent to 48 per cent while that of the non-state sector grew from more than 22 per cent to 52 per cent correspondingly. It is notable that, of the change in the share of the non-state sector, 2 Conceptually, the non-state sector includes collectively owned enterprises, private enterprises, jointventure enterprises, overseas Chinese enterprises and foreign enterprises (Lin et al., 1996:215) . Among them, collectively owned enterprises can be urban non-state and township and village enterprises (TVEs). TVE was used for the first time in, 1984 by the State Council to describe commune and brigade enterprises (Song, 2015:189) . TVEs constitute a major part of the non-state sector in terms of output, employment shares and the number of enterprises (Lin et al., 1996) . This feature will be shown in the text. Despite the differing types, entrepreneurship is the nature of all these enterprises as they are exposed to market rules in their operation. Lu (1994) and Huang (2008) described entrepreneurs as those operating private enterprises and TVEs.
collectively owned enterprises accounted for most of the change while private enterprises expanded to nearly 10 per cent. During the first stage of reform, the institutional setting had limited formal recognition of the position that private entrepreneurs and their business activities take. Their subordinate or auxiliary position resulted from the Chinese Government's experimental approach while a dominant perception of private entrepreneurs as capitalists and exploiters prevailed (Garnaut et al., 2001 ). Most importantly, there were no clearly defined private property rights (Huang, 2008) . The rapid expansion of non-state enterprises with their institutionally disadvantageous position has, however, been a big puzzle to many economists. From an institutional perspective, Huang (2008, p. 34) suggested that in the context of property rights security was not institutionalised; what made potential entrepreneurs willing to do business was directional liberalism-that is, policy promises and symbolic actions made by government leaders show the Government's reform intentions. In addition, as a way of responding to ideological and regulatory obstacles, many privately owned enterprises were registered as collectively owned enterprises, leading to a phenomenon of 'red hat' firms in the 1980s and, 1990s (Garnaut et al., 2001, p. 14) . Source: World Bank (1992).
Productivity performance is both an indicator of and a contributing factor to overall performance. In this early period of transition, non-state enterprises, particularly township and village enterprises (TVEs), had better productivity performance than SOEs, as shown in Table 1 . In the period 1980-88, and the sub-periods, 1980-84 and, 1984-88 , the collective sector always had a growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) nearly doubling that of the state sector. It has been widely agreed among scholars that the collective sector is in the marketised section of the economy, facing more competition and hard budget constraints; however, there would be no less important factors contributing to the high growth of output and productivity of the non-state sector in terms of the Government's role in resource allocation during this early stage of transition. This could be seen in three dimensions.
First, there was no clear focus for industrial strategy associated with SOE reform.
Instead, governments at various levels aimed their reform efforts at improving the efficiency performance of all existing SOEs through creating incentives for managers and workers. The gradual and experimental approach resulted in the dual-track price system, with the planned track and the market track. Importantly, as a result, the dualtrack system created channels for transferring resources, especially raw materials from the state sector, and industrial enterprises to the non-state sector through flows between planned allocation and market channels (Jefferson and Rawski, 1995, p. 141 ).
Moreover, the secular problem of shortage under planning (Kolodko, 2000) contributed to excess demand in the market for goods, especially industrial products. The excess market demand combined with improved access to materials created highly profitable opportunities for non-state firms. As suggested by Jefferson and Rawski (1995) , the high price gap due to shortages implicitly generated quasi-rents that were partly captured by non-state firms. The side effect of the dual-price system, however (and also evidence of rent-seeking), was the emerging rampant corruption of SOE managers and bureaucrats, as Lu (1994) indicated.
Second, local governments played an active and significant role in promoting the TVEs, with access to land, production sites, local utility services and flexible taxation.
An important impetus for local governments, especially at township and village levels, to become more involved in non-state business activities was fiscal reform (Xu, 2011) .
In the 1980s, fiscal reform was carried out by dividing the responsibility for and allocation of budget revenues and expenditures between the central and local governments (province, county and municipality). Local governments were given more autonomy for collecting revenues and making spending decisions. This was called the fiscal contracting system or the third contract responsibility system (World Bank, 1992), or 'fiscal federalism with political centralisation' (Zhang, 2002, p. 11) . Local governments were encouraged to generate revenues depending on local conditions. Therefore, the fiscal contracting system created incentives for local governments and bureaucrats to promote the development of local businesses (Bouckaert, 2007) . With the unfavourable institutional setting for private enterprises, the result was that local governments increased their nominal stake in local collectively owned enterprises. The involvement of local governments created favourable access for TVEs to land, production sites and local utility services and created a more equal footing for TVEs compared with SOEs. As an example, compared with TVEs, private entrepreneurs had to pay higher electricity prices and 2.5 times higher taxes in, 1985 (Chang and Wang, 1994, p. 445) . This fact further explains why private entrepreneurs often adopted the red-hat strategy.
Third, TVEs had favourable access to credit due to the active role of local governments in the context of limited credit and a partly commercialised banking system. In the 1980s, initial reform of the banking sector took place to establish the central bank, the People's Bank of China (PBC), and four state commercial banks, which were assigned to focus on lending to major corresponding sectors: agriculture, industry, construction and foreign trade (Riedel et al., 2007) . There was also a considerable network of rural and urban credit cooperatives. With limited household savings, rural credit cooperatives had strong links with the Agricultural Bank of China for their source of funding (Huang, 2008) . The close connections with local governments gave TVEs a strong position from which to access capital provided by rural credit cooperatives. Urban collective enterprises experienced a similar situation.
Facing a hostile business environment with low status, private entrepreneurs understandably used the red-hat strategy to overcome constraints on accessing to the most important resources. Arguably, TVEs could be an important platform for private enterprises to emerge and grow in the later period of reform.
It is obvious that TVEs outperformed SOEs, due both to being exposed to market conditions with the significant involvement of private entrepreneurship and to some favourable access to resources created by local governments.
The dual-track reform had produced a latently vibrant emergence of private entrepreneurs through releasing some productive resources wholly controlled by the state sector. Importantly, non-state enterprises contributed to the adjustment of industrial structure due to their labour-intensive activities (Lin et al., 1996) . The unexpected outcome in the sense of 'growing out of the plan' (Naughton, 1995) created strong competition pressures on SOEs (Jefferson and Rawski, 1995 Since, 1993, China has undertaken a series of market-oriented reforms and established market mechanisms applying to all economic activities; however, the extent of market rules and competition varies significantly across sectors of the economy. The important aspect is the extent of the role market forces in resource allocation, which can be seen in the structure of the enterprise system with a growing share of the private sector. Under the overarching framework of institutional reforms, changes in the ways the state controls key resources have been a key determinant shaping the evolution of private entrepreneurship, in the form of private sector development.
Conducive changes in the institutional environment and market opportunities for private enterprises
Major changes in political ideology and the legal framework to recognise the private sector happened after Deng Xiaoping's tour of southern China in, 1992, during which he made several important speeches signaling the supportive view of the Chinese leadership of the role of private entrepreneurs in generating the nation's prosperity (Naughton, 2007) . inflows (Chen, 2009, p. 336) . Large FDI inflows intensified domestic competition and demand for China's production factor endowments.
It appears there have been many favourable changes in the institutional setting for the development of private entrepreneurship. Marketisation and trade liberalisation have generated ample market opportunities, but significantly increased competition.
Lack of reform in factor markets and the evolution of private entrepreneurship
It has been argued above that transformation from a centrally planned economy to a market-based one can be seen as a process of releasing productive resources from the state to be determined and directed by market rules. Restructuring SOEs is part of such a process. In addition, the progress of market reform has come about with market liberalisation in all economic sectors. China's gradual approach has, however, shown the proactive and dominant role of the state in the direction and speed of market liberalisation. It has been identified that complete liberalisation has only happened in product markets, and not factor markets (Huang and Wang, 2010) . The factor markets are the areas where the state exerts significant control to influence the resource flows and the pattern of economic growth with consequences not in favour of private entrepreneurs. This can be seen in the context of SOE restructuring.
SOE restructuring and the expansion of the private sector
In the 1990s and, 2000s, SOE restructuring was implemented in tandem with promotion of private enterprises. In, 1995, radical reforms of SOEs started amid their deteriorating performance (particularly in terms of profitability and output growth) since the late, 1980s (Qian and Wu, 2000) . Reform directions were gradually developed over the years. For example, in November, 1993, the CCP's Decision on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure set forth the direction for the SOE reform that emphasised property rights, separation of ownership and enterprise management and allowed for privatisation and diversification of ownership. In October,
2003, the Third Plenum of the Sixteenth CCP Congress issued the Decision on Issues of
Perfecting the Socialist Market Economy, which was aimed at deepening SOE reform by focusing on shareholding ownership and corporatisation of SOEs. Importantly, the SOE reform in this period was different from the previous period in terms of the ownership transformation, called gaizhi, and the wide scale of SOE transformation.
Various measures have been adopted, ranging from bankruptcy, liquidation, listing and sales to private firms and auctioning. In the latter half of the 1990s, the process of transforming TVEs to private ownership took place progressively as many TVEs were facing losses due to their weak competitiveness, rigid management structure and decision-making due to collective ownership (Qian and Wu, 2000) . Moreover, the Government's official recognition of private property rights and support for private entrepreneurship had encouraged many privately run collective enterprises to take off their 'red hats' to become private firms. As a result, the number of private enterprises increased rapidly. At the same time, the number of TVEs declined at a quite rapid pace.
The share of SOEs in total gross output continued to decline, giving way to the rapidly emerging private sector. From the perspective of resource reallocation, SOE restructuring could be considered successful as the process led to a significant transfer of state assets to private entrepreneurs using the market mechanism, reducing the state's fiscal burden created by loss-making SOEs. The process was also successful in terms of both making room for expansion of the private sector (Xiao et al., 2009 ) and exploiting the dynamics and strength of private entrepreneurship in using resources (assets) more efficiently. There was also a significant concern about the loss of the state's assets and corruption through gaizhi. Obviously, the problem of rent-seeking associated with unproductive entrepreneurship is unavoidable. However, there is some evidence suggesting the losses could be small in some cases due to local governments' exchange for employment protection after privatisation (Garnaut et al., 2006) . Moreover, it has been found that the growing private sector contributed to reducing unemployment problems created by SOE restructuring.
Industrial strategy and asymmetric sectoral distribution of SOEs and non-state enterprises
An important feature of the SOE reform in the 1990s was the Government's introduction of an industrial strategy. In, 1994, the State Council approved 'An Outline of the State Industrial Policies in the 1990s'. The renewed industrial policy identified machinery-electronics, petrochemicals, automobile manufacture and construction as 'pillar industries'. Later, specific policies for pillar industries were developed, such as the industrial policy for the auto industry' (Lu, 2000) . This policy would be one of the key factors underlying the approach of SOE reform under the slogan of 'grasping the large, letting the small go', put forward by the Fifteenth CCP Congress. Consequently, some 1,000 SOEs were identified as large ones to be retained with whole state ownership when the SOE restructuring began. Subsequently, a group of key sectors has been identified as pillar industries, which includes energy, electricity, utilities, telecommunication, aviation and shipping. Since the 1990s, there have been some changes in the list of the pillar industry group, which now includes equipment, autos, electronics, information technology, construction, steel, metals, and chemicals (Baston, 2014, World Bank and DRC, 2013) .
Industrial policy has become one of the main tools guiding the Chinese Government's new approach to the control and allocation of key resources, especially production , 1994 , and, 2005 , , Yang (2012 shows that private firms are concentrated in manufacturing, retail trade, small services and catering.
Nevertheless, it is possible that there are not many private firms in some manufacturing industries that were designated as 'pillar' industries. In contrast, very few private enterprises operated in sectors such as power, construction, finance and insurance, and geology and watering, which are key utility sectors whose output is used by all other sectors. This situation remained unchanged from the start of SOE restructuring to the time when the deepening SOE reform was going on. The pattern of asymmetrical distribution of SOEs and private firms will be further discussed below.
Controlled financial system and private entrepreneurs' access to capital
While market liberalisation led to the retreat of the state in directing goods flows between economic sectors and regions, price liberalization made it increasingly impossible for the state to distort relative prices between sectors and regions for industrialisation (Zhang, 2002) . With growing household and firm incomes as a result of marketisation, the allocation of financial resources has become the main form of the state's resource control. On the one hand, in line with market reform, the Chinese Government gradually promoted the financial system, including banking, stock markets and the emergence of non-bank financial firms, to mobilise and channel savings for investment demand in the growing economy. On the other hand, the Government took the monopoly position in the financial system by using state-owned commercial banks and financial corporations with strict entry barriers and regulations. In fact, in line with developing the financial system of a market economy, the Government has continued to consolidate its dominant position in the financial system since the central-planning period. Key state-controlled financial institutions are state-owned commercial banks and rural and urban cooperatives. In the 1990s, the Government started to allow the market participation of the non-state sector, including shareholding commercial banks and foreign banks (Bonin and Huang, 2002; Song, 2005) . The participation of non-state commercial banks increased in the 2000s; however, state-owned financial institutions have been major players in the financial markets. It is clear that the controlled financial system enabled the Government to channel most savings to SOEs, particularly SOEs in pillar and strategic industries, and to undertake big infrastructure investment projects.
As a result, the private sector had limited access to capital from the formal banking sector. For example, in, 1999, private enterprises received only less than 0.5 per cent of loans from state-owned banks, which is in contrast with their contribution of nearly 35
per cent of industrial output in, 1998 (Song, 2005, pp 117) . Consequently, private enterprises had to rely much on informal financing paying much higher borrowing costs.
The monopoly position in the financial markets allowed the Government to impose financial repression. Using its monopoly of state-owned commercial banks, the Government has been able to set a low level of interest rates for bank deposits and lending (Riedel et al., 2007) . Moreover, 'the maintenance of interest rates at artificially low levels has made it difficult for domestic savers and investors to see the true price of capital' (Song, 2005, pp 115) . Cheap credit has been used to keep many loss-making SOEs viable, leading to the well-known problem of non-performing loans in the banking system (Riedel et al., 2007) .
By imposing low ceilings on borrowing and lending interest rates, the Government has created significant rents, which can be defined by the differences between the actual and the would-be market clearing interest rates. The rents would be much higher when taking into account the potential value of profitable projects for private entrepreneurs.
There has been long recognition that the extent of capital market distortions would be significant (Young, 2000; Zhang and Tan, 2007; Brandt and Zhu, 2010; Brandt et al., 2013) . Huang and Wang (2010) claimed that distortions caused by government interventions are not confined to the capital markets, but are also in the labour and natural resource markets. Notably, these distortions were substantial. For example, their estimates show that the value of factor market distortions was about RMB2.1 trillion in,
2008-equivalent to 7 per cent of GDP. Moreover, capital-market distortions accounted for the biggest share in the total since, 2000 (Huang and Wang, 2010, pp 307 ). An important issue here is how to view these distortions in terms of their impact on the private sector development.
State-led development of land markets and the private sector's access
In China, land is owned and managed by local governments in urban areas and by collectives in the countryside. Due to its sole ownership of land on behalf of all the people, the Government has control of land supply and land-use rights transfer (Tao, 2014) .
The land market is a contrasting case with the capital market in terms of accessibility for private enterprises given a similar feature of government monopoly in the market.
As a common practice, local governments have the authority to determine and collect land-use fees. Many local governments have used access to land as one of the main instruments to promote industrial and economic growth. Local governments actively promoted land developments for industrial sites. To attract manufacturing enterprises, many local authorities set low land-use fees. In many cases, land-use fees were only equal to or even lower than, the cost of land development (including compensation for existing land users, land-clearing costs and infrastructure building costs). In the past two decades, due to local competition in pursuit of rapid economic growth, many local governments have tried to reduce the cost of land development to create low land-use fees. The main method used is paying low land compensation fees to local farm households as most land transfers involve agricultural and rural land. Low land-use fees have been considered an important factor promoting rapid industrial development in many localities; however, the consequences of industrial land development are soaring land disputes and demonstrations. Land grabs are becoming a big concern for the Chinese Government. On this aspect of land market development, it appears that governments at various levels have used their monopoly position of sole ownership to release land resources with low prices for industrial enterprises, including private enterprises. Conceptually, distorted industrial land prices have implicit government subsidies, which are equivalent to implicit rents. Otherwise, industrial development would have been constrained by rising land prices due to rising demand from industrial investment.
Another aspect of land market development is urbanisation and residential land expansion (Tao, 2014) . Rapid industrialisation has promoted urbanisation through attracting millions of rural migrants. Urbanisation, in combination with increasing income levels, has created huge demand for new housing and residential land. Excess demand for urban and industrial land use has caused land prices to soar due to the government-controlled supply of land. Recognising the rapid growth of demand for land, local governments have actively managed the supply of land for urban and industrial uses. Being able to control land supply has enabled local governments to determine land-use prices and collect substantial revenue for their budgets. Importantly, soaring land prices in many locations with rapid industrial and urban expansion have generated substantial rents, which can be defined here as the difference between the market price and the cost of land supply by the Government. Moreover, there could be additional rents when the actual market value of land was higher than the sale price determined by the Government. Revenues for local government budgets from residential land sales or auctions have been used mainly for building infrastructure. On this aspect of land market expansion, the Government's monopoly in land supply has generated rents that were captured by the Government for public investment, but it is achieved at the expenses of the rural farmers.
In relation to land, the Government also has monopoly power over other natural resources such as energy (electricity, oil) and public utilities and other natural endowments. It has been argued that government control of key sectors (coal, electricity, oil and water) has distorted the markets in favour of industrial development. Huang and Wang's (2010) estimates suggest these distortions were significant during the period 2000-08, ranging from 3.6 to 6.4 per cent of GDP. Again, government control of resources has created significant economic rents, which were used to support industrialisation.
Beneficial aspects of the state control of resources during market reform
Since the SOE restructuring process started in the 1990s, the Government has made effective interventions in factor markets, which have created substantial rents. Its dominant position in these markets has helped the Government to mobilise resources, especially financial resources to build large scale infrastructure. Large SOEs have large undertakings in building public infrastructure. Government-led infrastructure investments have had both short-term and long-term effects on economic growth through long-term productivity growth as these projects reduced firms' transaction costs. In this sense, government control of resources to generate key infrastructure has been supportive of the development of private entrepreneurship. Xiao et al. (2009, pp 166) showed the impressive achievements of China in infrastructure building. For example, the total length of highways increased from 1.16 million km in, 1995 to 3.46 million km in, 2006. At the same time, the railway network expanded from 59,700 km to 77,100 km, and there was a huge increase of mobile phone subscribers, from eight million to 610 million. In terms of value, Zhang et al. (2012, p. 9) reported that the annual amount of public expenditure increased from RMB73. To some extent, Khan's (2004) observation that a state with strong capacity can generate and manage rents that are growth-enhancing seems to be relevant to China's experience.
In another dimension, the rents created by government control of resource and factor markets, despite being a market distortion, have been used as strong incentives to attract and support investment from the non-state sector. Many studies have suggested that this has been an important factor contributing to China's investment-driven pattern of growth.
What are the inefficiency effects of resource control and when did they worsen?

Distorted investment patterns
Despite generating investment effects for growth, state-maintained low resource prices appear to have led to some overinvestment in manufacturing (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2006) , resulting in lower investment returns. From the 1990s to the 2000s, the investment cost of $1 additional growth increased from $3 to $4 (Zheng et al., 2009, p878) . Excessive investment has gradually accumulated to generate China's structural imbalances of economic growth (McKay and Song, 2010) . While there is a certain rationale for the intervention of the Government in some industries with natural monopoly characteristics, the growth of the private sector with its better performance has caused concerns about the Government's dominance in these industries. Figure 2 presents the share of the state sector in total assets and output in a number of industrial subsectors in, 2011. It suggests a clear difference between the total asset share and the output share of SOEs. There are only four subsectors in which the asset share is equal to or greater than the output share: petroleum and gas, processing of nuclear and petroleum materials, tobacco, and water supply (these industries appear to be pure state monopolies 
Unequal access to resources, rent-seeking and unproductive entrepreneurship
It is well known in literature on entrepreneurship that access to credit or capital is one of the most important issues for a private enterprise to succeed in the market. The lack of capital prevents private firms from taking up profitable opportunities for business start-ups or expansion. Deepening SOE reform has forced state-owned commercial banks to operate on a commercial basis and look for profitable private enterprises to which to lend (Firth et al., 2009) . The tradition of favouring the SOEs has remained, however, meaning access to bank credit is a significant challenge for private enterprises, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which are the main form of private entrepreneurship (Shen et al., 2009) . Financial repression in China creates a contradiction that has long emerged in the China's financial markets: there is substantial excess demand on the one hand, and a limited supply of credit for entrepreneurs on the other. Therefore, there exist rents that could be significant due to the gap between the market clearing level and the regulated interest rate. The rents could be much more larger if we take into account the opportunity costs of forgone market opportunities identified by entrepreneurs. To overcome credit constraints, many private enterprises have used informal channels to obtain loans or credit. The guanxi network 3 of Chinese entrepreneurs has been long well known (Liao and Sohmen, 2001) . Because the state has significant control over bank credit and other resources, government officials in charge of managing resources have an advantageous position from which to access capital and resources. Consequently, the guanxi approach has been expanded to overcome constrained access to key business resources among many private entrepreneurs with benefits of sharing the available rents to both government officials and private firms.
The scope of guanxi has also been extended to seeking government subsidies and market opportunities through contracts in developing infrastructure projects. Actually, rent-seeking and corruption has become a worrying trend as a result of market transition process (Wu and Huang, 2008) .
Several studies have documented the evidence of private firms trying to get bank loans or to gain access to government subsidies through political connections (Zhou, 2009; Bai et al., 2006; Wu and Cheng, 2011) . Similarly as for other resources, especially land and property development, state control is likely to create unproductive entrepreneurial activities due to the speculative nature of the market in the context of the Government's controlled supply of land in localities with high demand for housing and residential land. In a sense, there should be a concern as there have been some entrepreneurs who concentrate their investment in political connections for profitable opportunities. While quantitative evidence remains to be a challenge, this kind of unproductive entrepreneurship, conceptualized by Baumol (1990) , is a real fact in China's fast growing private sector as already mentioned by several scholars, particularly Wu and Huang (2008) .
Some evidence has been found showing that private enterprises with political connections perform better than those without (Choi and Zhou, 2001; Faccio, 2006) .
Whether this trend is consistent or not, what matters is that this kind of better performance is not based on competition and efficiency grounds, which is crucial for long-term productivity growth. A more important issue is the disincentive and negative spill-over effects of the unequal and restricted access to productive resources. Private firms are induced to invest in political connections for potential profitable opportunities.
Those private firms, especially SMEs, with high potential of innovations and productivity growth, but without political connections would find it hard to get start-up capital and other forms of government support for R&D while less-productive firms with political connections continue to stay in the industry, preventing the process of technological change from taking place in many of the industries. 
Changes in resource control and productivity performance
Further assessment of the efficiency of the state control of resources could be seen in the TFP performance in relation to financial performance.
Based on the estimation of labour productivity and growth accounting simulations, Brandt and Zhu (2010) provided some evidence of the impacts of state control of resources on the productivity performance of SOEs compared with non-SOEs, as shown in Table 2 . In the period 1988-98, the labour productivity of non-SOEs was nearly double that of SOEs (6.17 per cent versus 3.46 per cent). The TFP growth of the nonSOEs had a greater impact on the growth of the TFP of the two sectors. Notably, the data show that capital distortions played a more important role in promoting the productivity of SOEs, while they had a much smaller effect on promoting the productivity of non-SOEs. In contrast, an increase in investment had little effect on the labour productivity of both sectors. Therefore, capital control was a significant factor after TFP for the labour productivity performance of SOEs. During the , 1998-2007, SOEs had substantially higher labour productivity growth than non-SOEs. This could be due to the deepening of SOE reform that makes SOEs larger with more access to credit. In this period, the TFP growth of non-SOEs and SOEs had a quite similar effect on the labour productivity of other sectors. Again, investment had less impact on the labour productivity growth of non-SOEs than SOEs. It appears that, compared with the 1988-98 period, the SOEs' TFP performance improved significantly and was the main contributor to labour productivity growth, rather than investment. Most importantly, capital market distortions had a significant negative impact on the labour productivity growth of non-SOEs. In contrast, SOEs clearly benefited from capital market distortions. Therefore, in line with the development of factor markets, the state control of resources had significantly negative effects on the performance of non-SOEs, and private enterprises in particular. Source: Brandt and Zhu (2010) .
Overall, the examination of the financial and productivity performance of the SOE and non-state sectors has shown that the state's control of resources, in terms of interventions in the factor markets, had negative impacts on the performance of private enterprises, despite their better performance in general as compared with SOEs. This means that SOE restructuring and the change in focus of state resource control have promoted the performance of the state sector, but at the expense of efficiency losses of private enterprises in the non-state sector.
IV. Concluding remarks
We have used the framework of entrepreneurship development to analyse the pattern and impact of change in the state's control of resources on the emergence and evolution as well as outcomes of private entrepreneurship in China during market transition over the past 30 years. In this framework, entrepreneurship development depends on two sets of factors: business environment (legal and regulatory framework, market opportunities and cultural factors) and enterprise resources (production factors and entrepreneurial ability). State-led resource allocation during transition is considered to play a central role in determining the resources needed for the emergence and evolution of private entrepreneurship in China.
The examination of SOE reform and change in the state's control of resources has
shown that private entrepreneurship has emerged and developed robustly in the context of China's market reform. Apart from improving the environment for private entrepreneurship, the change in the ways the Government controls key productive resources has had significant impacts on the performance of private enterprises. In the most recent years, when the product markets have been liberalised, state interventions in factor markets have had more negative impacts on the performance of the private sector.
Given a larger share and better performance of private enterprises, reducing the state's control of key resources would promote productivity and economic growth in the future.
The analysis suggests that more competition and better use of productive resources would require lowering and removing entry barriers to private enterprises in key or pillar industries and services, particularly financial and banking systems. Increased participation of private firms in key industries and services will improve the access of the whole private sector to key resources, especially capital and credit. Recent growing investment and participation of private firms in financial and banking activities show positive signs of financial resource allocation 4 . However, the change in the government's regulatory and policy to increase private sector role in allocation of key resources could not be made possible without its links with broader framework of institutional changes designed to direct more entrepreneurial efforts into more productive uses. Institutional changes and adjustments should be initiated whenever there are gaps and loopholes found in developing the market system for better protection of private property rights, more effective regime of contract enforcement and necessary regulations to ensure the social accountability and transparency of the government's administrative system.
